






RESEARCH of the past decade has served to underscore the
close psychological relationship between humans, chimpan-
zees, and the other great apes. In his evolutionary theory.
Darwin (1860, 1871) posited both psychological and biological
continuities between animals and humans. Although the
evidence for biological continuity has been strong for decades,
the evidence necessary for affirmation of psychological
continuity is recent.
Descartes and Animals
The absence of strong evidence for the processes of
intelligence and language in animals has permitted the earlier
proclamations of Descartes ([163711936) in the mid-1600s to
spawn the belief of discontinuity. Because animals could not
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talk sensibly, it was easy for people to conclude that animals
had no sensibilities. Thev came to be viewed as "subhuman" or
"infrahuman"--as not having made the grade to the exalted
status of human. They were held to be without reason,
thought, affect, intelligence, and language.
Humans, but not animals, were able to think because they
had rational souls. Accordingly, they could be held accountable
for their actions--and for their sins. When they sinned, God
inflicted pain. But God would surely spare all animals from
ever experiencing pain. After all, without souls, thev were not
responsible for their action--and, thus, could not sin. Despite
the fact that the rationale for Descartes' beast-machine concept
has faded with the centuries, the concept is still very much
alive.
Throughout history, humans have sought lines of argument
and fact that would make us unique from animals. Different
we are, but not so totally different as some would think.
The Null Hvpothesis, Darwin, and Continui_
Adherence to the view that our species has a totallv unique
psychology is to misuse the Null Hypothesis. The Null
Hypothesis holds that there is "no difference" between us and
animals. Onlv with evidence sufficient to reject that hypothesis
should one argue that "a real difference" exists--one not
attributable to chance. By contrast, the general tendency has
been to begin with the conclusion that real differences do exist
between the psychology of humans and animals, and that the
onus is upon the researcher to come up with proof to the
contrary!
Darwin basically advanced the Null Hypothesis as he argued
for continuity from animals to human. He did not go so far,
though, as to argue for identity of process. Apes are apes, apes
are not humans; but because of the very close genetic similarity
which they share (>98% shared DNA; Sarich, 1983; Andrews
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and Martin, 1987: Siblev and Ahlquist, 1987), there are
neurobiologicalgroundsto anticipatesomedegreeof similarity
in their psychology.
That said,attentionisnow directedto behavioralresearchof
recent years,both here and abroad, that has produced an
abundanceof evidencefor rejection of the Cartesianbeast-
machineconcept and for support of Darwin's postulations of
continuitv. Animals have been fimnd capable of complex
communication, symbolizing capacities, rule-learning, number
learning, and even language.
Comparative Cognition
The Language Research Center's history rests in our
long-standing interests in the parameters of human intelli-
gence that might be traced to our nearest living relatives--the
great and lesser apes, the monkevs of the New and Okt
Worlds. and the prosimians (Napier and Napier, 1994). One
tactic for this study posited a relationship between Tran._fer o/'
Learmng and Brain Cornplexitr.
Transfe," of Learning
Transfer of learning is a very important element in general-
ized competence. Most learning takes place in relatively specific
contexts--a student studies biology at his/her desk; a teenager
learns how to drive a Chevrolet; a pilot learns to fly a single-
engine plane: a student learns sculpting in a studio; and so on.
Transfer of learning can influence subsequent learning (for
example, acquiring infi)rmation about something) and perfor-
mance (for example, doing a task, taking a test, and so on) in two
basic ways. First, the effect can be a facilitating or positive one.
The learning or performing of one task might facilitate the learn-
ing of a second task. Learning to drive a stick-shift Chevrolet
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entailsmanyprinciplesthat canbeappliedto learningto drivea
varietyof othercars.One"knowssomethingquitegeneralabout
driving" afterthe stickshift carhasbeenmastered.The learning
of onesubjectin biologycan,and should,facilitatethe learning
of another,and soon. On the other hand,the effect canbean
impedimentor negative one, in part if not wholly. Thus, learning
to drive in a car with a stick shift can have a negative effect on
subsequently driving an automatic shift car. For example, one's
left foot may flail around when one attempts to stop a car that
has no clutch. Use of the feet is relevant to the stopping of most
vehicles, but the specifics of what they are to do can be either
positive or negative. All of us have had problems with vehicles
where controls are either absent or relocated compared to the
car we drive most frequently (that is, controls for turn-signals,
headlights, windshield wipers, and so forth). Pilots become gen-
erally competent (positive transfer) in learning to fly a wide va-
riety of planes, but past expectations about the locations of spe-
cific vital controls (that is, the throttle, the flaps control, and so
on) can lead to disaster (negative transfer) in crisis situations where
there is no time to analyze what to do to correct the problem.
Finally, it is acknowledged that learning one thing, such as French,
might have absolutely no transfer of learning relevance to flying
a plane or driving a car.
Generally, persons who are facile at transferring even small
amounts of learning have a marked advantage in new
situations and are viewed as highly intelligent and clever. They
are able to see common principles and logical as well as
functional dimensions of relationships among diverse situa-
tions and topics. For them, for example, the learning of Latin
facilitates the learning of many other languages and academic
subjects. For others, Latin has no relevance to anything!
Primate Brains and Transfer of Learning
Interestingly, primate species differ both markedly and
rather systematically in the ease with which they can learn and
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transfer their learning. The size and complexity of primate
brains can result in comparable amounts of learning being
transferred positive& for some species (notably the larger ones)
and negatively for other species (notably the smaller ones). The
differences in transfer are associated with average brain size
per species and are not reliablv associated with differences in
brain size among individual specimens with a species, except
insofar as brain size and complexity increases with growth and
development to maturity.
Transfer of learning and skills is basic to the development of
competence in both humans and animals. Accordingly, great
emphasis has been placed upon the assessment of transfer-of-
learning skills in studies of primate intelligence. Both
conceptually and procedurally it can be studied in comparable
ways across species, for we can assess the efficiency and effect
of transfer relative to what the individual is known to have
learned. Several of our own studies, designed to relate primate
brain evolution to transfer-of-learning competence, have been
facilitated by the development and use of the Transfer Index
(TI) (Rumbaugh and Pate, 1984).
The TI is a procedure designed to afford equitable
assessments of primates' complex learning and transfer skills.
Its design attenuates artifactual differences between species'
learning and performance that might be produced due to their
differences of size, manual dexterity, processes of attention,
and so on. Brain complexity was estimated according to
Jerison's (personal communication) estimations of the "extra"
brain and neurons afforded primates due to the process of
encephalization. Encephalization refers to an enlargement of
the brain's size/weight relative to the body's weight beyond that
which would be afforded by allometric relationships that
characterize a variety of proportions and weights of the body's
anatomy. In other words, a certain amount of brain is needed
just to service the tissue needs, processes, and basic behaviors
of the body.
Thus, within limits, allometric relationships imply that large
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mammalswill have larger brains than small mammals.But
apart from that, encephalization refers to the tendencv for the
brains, notablv those of primate species and in particular those
of the great apes and our own, to be extraordinarily large. It is
this "extra" brain size and complexity which surely provides
the basis for intelligence both in primates and humans, who
also are a primate form.
Research with over 121 primate subjects of several species
relates their transfer-of-learning skills, as assessed by the TI, to
the dimension of brain complexity in averv interesting
manner: a qualitative shift in those skills was documented in
interaction with the amount of learning established prior to
tests of transfer.
The amount of learning prior to test was defined bv
achievement standards that required the subjects to learn sets
of visual discrimination learning problems to two levels of
correctness--67% and 84% choices correct--to prepare them
for tests of their transfer skills. These achievement standards.
in effect, required that the subjects achieve specified numbers
of choices correct within specified numbers of training trials
prior to test for transfer of learning. As one might expect, the
84% level required that more choices be correct than did the
67% level.
The learning situation in which these performance sched-
ules were applied was a series of two-choice, object-
discrimination problems. Each problem consisted of a pair of
objects that clearly differed from one another in size, color,
and form. One object of each pair, if chosen, resulted in food,
whereas choice of the other object resulted in no food. Once
the subject achieved the level of mastery required (either 67%
or 84%) for a given set of problems, the test of transfer of
learning was given.
This transfer test consisted in "switching" the correctness of
the objects: the object that was associated with food, if chosen,
now became "incorrect," and the object which had not been
associated with food now became correct. The TI computes
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the degree to which transfer of learning was positive or
negative--or absent--on the basis of performance on a series
of problems.
Figure I portrays the change in test performance (percent-
age responses correct) obtained as the learning standard was
increased from the 67% to the 84% level. And it is here that a
vet 3, important finding must be clarified.







Figure 1. The enhancement of transfer-of-learning in relation to brain com-
plexity of primate (N= 121) is portrayed. The vertical axis quantifies the
change in the percentage of responses that are correct as a result of the
per-transfer test learning criterion being increased from 67% to 84% correct.
Each point on the baseline is for a particular species, except for the one (right
end) that is for 5 language-competent chimpanzees and bonobos of the Lan-
guage Research Center. Their enhanced performance is believed to be due to
the enrichment afforded by their research participation and their language
skills. (See Acknowledgments for contributions of unpublished data from
others. See Cooper [1980] and De Lilio & Visalberghi [1994] as sources for
data on Phaner, Microcebus, & Capuchin. Other unpublished capuchin data
was contributed by Hopkins and Suomi.)
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smaller monkeys generally tended to do worse (for example,
they had fewer choices correct on transfer tests after being
trained to the 84% than to the 67% level). For them, increasing
the amount learned handicapped their performance on
transfer tests and produced negative transfer effects with these
procedures. By contrast, the great apes and even the larger
and more complex-brained monkeys improved in their
transfer tests as the level of per-test learning was increased.
For them, the more they knew, the better they did on transfer
tests--the greater their positive transfer of learning.
I again emphasize that the ability to learn and to transfer
one's learning to a leveraged advantage is generally held
among humans to be evidence of "smartness," not "dumb-
hess." Thus, it is here argued that the great apes are
substantially smarter than monkeys and prosimians because of
their ability to transfer what they have learned to a leveraged
advantage in transfer tests. That advantage is so great that
many of the ape and larger species of monkey subjects (that is,
Rhesus macaques) do substantially better on the transfer test
trials than they had been allowed to during the learning trials
(for example, when trained to, say, the 67_, level, they would
be 785{ correct on transfer tests--a value higher than required
prior to test).
For primates, a large body means a disproportionately large
brain and extra neurons, which, in turn, correlate highly with
the values obtained from the v-axis of the tigure shown (extra
brain volume, r= .82; and extra neurons, r= .79, respectively).
Average body weights and brain weights per species correlated
highly with each other (0.96); body weight correlated highly
with transfer-of-learning proficiency (0.88); and brain weight
per species also correlated highly with transfer skills (0.84).
Jerison's (1991) Encephalization Coefficient, which relates
brain weight to body weight, is only generally correlated with
the body weights of the primate species here used. For
example, although both the diminutive squirrel monkey and
talapoin have higher Encephalization Coefficients than does
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the massivegorilla, they aresubstantiallybelowthe gorilla in
their complexlearningand transfer skills. Consequently,that
measure did not correlate significantly with transfer-of-
training skillssignificantly.
Simian InteUigence
Before addressing the research which has perhaps most
firmly cemented the continuum that relates the psychology of
apes and humans--that is, language--let us consider the
smartness of monkeys. Monkeys have an order of smartness or
intelligence that is substantially below that of the apes, but even
so at least the larger-sized ones are impressive.
Research at our Center defined their ability to use a joystick
in a batter), of complex tasks designed to measure their
learning, memory, vigilance, eve-hand coordination, planning,
relative-value judgments, and so on in relation to physiological
changes (Rumbaugh, Richardson, Washburn, Savage-Rum-
baugh, and Hopkins, 1989; Washburn, Hopkins, and Rum-
baugh, 1989; Washburn and Rumbaugh, 1992a,b). For our
purposes, our review of findings is limited to the following:
• Rhesus' performance on the TI and the number of trials
which the)" work each day are the best predictors of training
success on our comprehensive batter)' of tasks referenced
above.
• Rhesus prefer to work on tasks of their choice rather than
passively to receive incentives for "free."
• Rhesus respond more quickly and accurately when they can
choose tasks on which to work than when those same tasks are
assigned by experimental procedures.
• Rhesus are "super-learners" in that the,,' readily learned the
relative values of the numeral set 0-9 and i]lduced their
comprehensive relationships of relative values. They did this
in a learning situation ill which they did not have to choose
the larger number in order to get peilets and then were tested
on a series of novel pairs. Even on these novel test trials, thex
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Figure 2a. and 2b. A rhesus monkey (Macaca mulatta) works on a
numeric task portrayed on the monitor of the Language Research
Center's Computerized Test System (LRC-CTS).
PRIMATE LANGUAGE 721
reliably picked the number of greater pellet value (Washburn
and Rumbaugh, 1991).
• Handedness (for example, reliable use of either the right or
left hand rather than both) for joystick manipulation is
strongly established in Rhesus, and right-handed monkeys
(for example, those who like most humans in writing do best if
they use their right hand) tend to be more facile learners than
left-handed monkeys.
• Rhesus monkeys manifest characteristics of selective attention
similar to those of humans. For instance, they are sensitive to
tim Stroop-like interference when quantities, between which
they are to differentiate, are comprised of Arabic numbers
(Washburn, 1994). (The Stroop effect is exemplified when,
flw example, a human subject is asked to name the color of the
ink in which various words are printed where the words
themselves are names of colors--hut where there is a lack of
congruence between the word and the color in which it is
primed. Thus, it is generally difticult to say "green" when it
refers to the color of ink used to print the word "red.") When
required m choose the array with the greater quantity of items,
Rhesus monkeys do less well if that arra_' is made up of
numerals that stand for relatively small quantities (that is, 2s
or 3s) compared to the other array that is made of numerals
lhat are relatively higher (that is, "Ts or 8s).
Apes and Language
But what of the apes' language abilities? It was just a few
years ago that evidence then available in support of apes'
capacity for language was contested by others as attributable to
inadvertent cuing by the apes' mentors. _ Even then, however,
we knew that two of our chimpanzee subjects, Sherman and
Austin, could look at their word-lexigrams, each being the
name of either a specific food they ate or of a specific tool they
used to extricate fi)od fl'om puzzle boxes, and categorize them
accurately through use of two other word-lexigrams--one
standing ti>r "food" and the other for "tool." Their compe-
tence in doing thus, in controlled tests, documented their basic
capacity for semanlics--the meanings of symbols or words
(Savage-Rumbaugh, 1986).
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But recently our Center has produced findings that even we
would not have thought possible 10 years ago. The basic
finding (Savage-Rumbaugh, Murphy, Sevcik, Brakke,
Williams, and Rumbaugh, 1993) is that the apes can come to
understand even the syntax of human speech, at a level that
compares favorably with that of a 2-1/2 year old child--if they
are reared from shortly after birth in a language-structured
environment. By "language-structured" environment I mean
one in which the apes' caretakers talk to the infant apes as
though the), understand all that was being said--announce-
ments of what is about to happen and descriptions of items
selected jointly for attention by the ape and its caretaker.
Speech Comprehension by Apes
Reared in this manner, the infant ape's brain develops in a
manner that enables it to acquire language--first through its
comprehension and then through its expression, a pattern that
characterizes the course of language acquisition in the normal
child. The ape's comprehension of spoken words is assessed by
whether or not it is able to select the appropriate referent for
single words that it hears in controlled experimental situations.
Their comprehension of syntax is assessed by their capacity to
respond logically to novel sentences of request that they hear.
The research program included a child. Alia, 2-1/2 ),ears
old. The first ape was Kanzi, a bonobo--a rare species of
chimpanzee (Pan paniscus).
Kanzi's comprehension of over 600 novel sentences of
request was very comparable to Alia's; both complied with the
requests without assistance on approximately 70c_ of tile
sentences. If explanation, comment, or encouragement were
offered to the subjects when the?, appeared hesitant about
what was being asked of them, their assessed level of
correctness was down-graded. (All requests were unrehearsed.
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Figure 3. Kanzi listens to words that he hears through headphones
during controlled tests of his speech comprehension.
Personnel in the test room listened to loud music so that they
could not hear the requests posed to Kanzi.)
How did Kanzi acquire his comprehension of language
(Savage-Rumbaugh and Lewinl 1994)? Not through formal
instruction, but rather just by being present while his mother,
Matata, was receiving her language instruction--instruction
with lexigrams, not speech comprehension. Quite possibly it
was because Matata was reared by feral bonobos until about
age 6-years that she never benefited reliably from her
language instruction. It was as though her cognitive structure
had been fully committed to topics associated with life in the
forest. Though smart by every measure when out in the 55
acres of forest that surround the Language Research Center,
she did not learn readily about language. By contrast, the
language-learning abilities of her offspring have been impres-
sive.
The discovery afforded by Kanzi has been corroborated with
two other bonobos, Mulika (Sevcik, 1989) and Panbanisha, and
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to a more limited though significant degree with a common
chimpanzee, Panzee (Savage-Rumbaugh, Brakke, and
Hutchins, 1992). Panbanisha and Panzee were co-reared for
their first four years.
Early Environment, Rearing, and Competence
As exciting as it has been to document the apes' language
skills, even more important is the principle derived from their
research: it is in the logic-structure of the infants' environ-
ments that their complex abilities, competencies, and dimen-
sions of intelligence and expression are formed. Their
formation is behaviorally "silent" in that their expression might
not occur until the age of 2 vears or older (Savage-Rumbaugh,
1991). It is during infancy that important basic vectors of
competence are formed (Rumbaugh, Hopkins, Washburn, and
Savage-Runlbaugh, 1991 ).
Earlier studies of the 1960s and '70s made clear that
chimpanzees subjected to impoverished rearing even during
the first two years of infancy only are both socially and
cognitively deticient in their capacity for complex learning and
tim transfer of learning some 12 years later as young adults
(Davenport, Rogers. and Rumbaugh, 1973).
It is significant that appropriate language-strt, ctured rearing
established in the ape what none of the earlier efforts designed
to teach apes specific language skills throt, gh use of tutorials
could--namely, the ability to comprehend speech and its
syntax (Savage-Rumbaugh and Lewin, 1994). Such rearing also
serves to support the spontaneous appearance (|or example.
without specific training) of productive language skills that
approximate those of a 1-1/2 vear old normal child (Green-
field and Savage-Rumbaugh, 1c)91, 1993).
And given the opportunity to observe a professional
flinl-knapper, Kanzi learned about stone tools--their use,
value, and means of production (Toth, Schick, Savage-
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Rumbaugh,Sevcik,and Rumbaugh, 1993).Over time, he has
becomea reasonablyskilled flint knapper; that is, he makes
stone toolsand doesso with good sense.He assesseshis flint
chips for sharpnessand, quite appropriately, makeslarger
chipsto cut thick cablesof rope and smallerchips to cut fine
ones.
Apes, Language, and the Human Perspective
Elsewhere (Rumbaugh and Savage-Rumbaugh, 1994) we
have presented a perspective of apes and their language skills
and how both the research and the controversy surrounding it
has taken form across the course of the past several decades.
Suffice it to say, first, that the history of behavioral science has
documented that it is very unlikely that theorists will abandon
positions for which they have become known. Major changes in
perspectives frequently must await the "second" generation of
scientists to incorporate the data and the best of diverse
perspectives into their science. Nevertheless, the following are
held to be factual and without logical refutation: (1) Apes are
capable of learning the meanings and representational use of
arbitrary symbols that for them have all the functional
properties of words. The svmbols stand for things that are not
necessarily present in time and space, for activities, for the
properties of things (that is, temperatures of drinks, ambient
noise levels), for the individual's state (that is, hunger, thirst,
sleepiness), for other animates (either ape or human or
canine), for places to which they would go, for making
comments on activities and recent happenings in the labora-
tory, and so on. These assertions are based on data obtained
from controlled scientific tests, replications of studies with
different subjects, as well as affirmed by social communication
between humans and apes across decades. The processes
whereby symbols, signs, and gestures optimally acquire these
semantic properties are cultivated during early rearing of the
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ape--just as is the casefor the normal child. Formal,discrete
trial training of languageskills is relativelyineffectiveand does
not establishthe ability to comprehendsubstantialamountsof
human speech.(2) Early rearing can establishin the ape the
ability to understand the meaningsof human speech--even
novel sentencesof request. Thus, the apes spontaneously
acquirea capacitythat isnormal for the humanchild--though
not for the ape.(3) Early rearingcanestablish,first, the ability
to understand, to comprehend language,and, second,the
ability to employgrammarasdoesthe 1- 1-1/2year-oldchild.
Critics who emphasizethat theapescannotdo "all" that the
normal child doesand who emphasizespeechproduction as
the sine q_ga non of language err in discounting the significance
of highly important findings produced by language research
with apes. Research with apes has made it very clear that the
basis for language is comprehension, not speech. Although
speech is a highly efficient, unsurpassed medium for linguistic
communication, competence in speech rests primarily in
comprehension--and onlv secondarilv in the speech and
hearing systems that normal humans enjoy. The bedrock of
human language processes are traceable to the great apes. And
while the great apes are not our ancestors, they are closer to
our evolutionary roots than other primate forms.
Apes are not humans--and they probably are quite happy
about that fact! Notwithstanding, thev are so closelv related to
us that it is totally reasonable that thev have several of the basic
elements of human intelligence and language--and indeed
they do, though nothing would declare that thev must!
Common genetics implies not only common ancestry and
morphology, it also implies common neuroscientific bases for
psychology and behavior. Those who insist on the "total
separation" of human and ape psychology, behavior, and
competence err in discounting the evolutionary bases which
supported the emergence of the primates and notably the
great apes and even ourselves!
In sum, the long-held views advanced bv some authorities
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regarding languageas a processunique to humans and the
insistenceby others that a barrier be "declared,"regardlessof
data, betweenthe basicintellectual processesof animalsand
humans(asfor the ability to plan, reason,symbolize,and so
on) havebeencontrary to the end that relevantresearchdata
be given their proper consideration.Researchdata clearly
indicate that nonhumanprimates,and notably the greatapes,
are competent in several, though not all, of the essential
dimensionsof languageand other complexprocesses.
As statedabove,apesarenot humans,and humansare not
apes.Differencesbetweenthemare inherent in their genetics.
Nevertheless,by the sameperspective,theyand weare not to-
tally different. Thus, non-trivial similaritiesbetweenthe great
apesand usshouldbe expectedand happily incorporatedinto
our understandingof life, thenaturalworld, and our "nature."
A New Comparative Perspective
In closing, Descartes and his beast-machine model of animals
was wrong. That is now clear. Descartes' beast-machine model of
animals has been discredited. His error should no longer be
promu!gated by the thinking and values of our society.
Apes have vaulted the language barrier. The psychological
continuum of humans with them is in place. Apes are not
humans--but despite Descartes' proclamation to the contrary,
within their own existences they surely reason. Such must be
the case because it is certain that their impressive learning and
language skills did not evolve for the purposes attendant to
those of the research laboratory.
Being competent for reasoning, they, along with us, surely can
experience a number of dimensions of being. They are surely
capable of experiencing pain. (Here it is appropriate to credit
veterinary science of recent years with caring for animals that
manifest symptoms of pain as probably experiencing pain.)
Apes are great, both in size and intelligence. Their care and
conservation are challenges that must be met with renewed
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energy and commitment. Their appropriate scientific study,
conducted sensitivelv and responsibly, can be of great value to
us as we strive to learn more accuratelv about the nature of our
own species and how, through the management of earlv
rearing and early experiences, we can rear generations who
will be responsible to themselves, toward others, toward this
planet, and toward the natural resources and wildlife that
share the planet with us.
Notes
See Rumbaugh and Savage-Rumbaugh, 1994, for a review.
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